The Khabour River Drought, Who is Responsible?

A Guest Opinion

Andrew Bet-Shlimon
Rhode Island

I was astonished to see the drastic changes that occurred in the Khabour region, in Jazeera province, during my visit to Syria this past summer. What was once an imposing river is now a dried out, desolate valley. Before I go into details of what happened to the Khabour River, I would like to outline a short chronology of the life of this river in the recent times, and its impact on the Assyrian villages in that region.

Khabour River in the 1970's... boats known locally as Kalak were used to cross the river from one village to another.

Khabour River, located almost entirely within Syria, was a tributary of the Euphrates River. It flowed southeastward through the city of Al-Hasakah, in the Jazirah region of northeastern Syria, and turned due south and ran through the semi-arid southern Jezireh to its confluence with the Euphrates River near Deir-ez-Zor. The river rose from the mountains of southeastern Turkey, nevertheless, it was mainly spring-fed from sources in Ras Al-Ain (Rish Aina), an ancient town in north-east Syria, and was recharged almost exclusively by precipitation. The river had a total length of about 200 miles and a natural flow, gauged at Hasakah, between 1.4 to 1.6 million cubic-meters per year at its heyday.

Following the Simele massacre of August 1933, the first of many massacres which targeted the Assyrian Christians of Northern Iraq, some 6,000 Assyrians who survived the massacre fled to Syria, where they settled along the banks of the Khabour River. Within a few years, these settlements expanded to thirty-five villages on both banks of this abundant body of water, stretching from the village of Um-Ghragan to Tel-Taweel.

With the hard work and ingenuity of the Assyrian settlers, who were mainly farmers by trade, Khabour region’s landscape was transformed from what was practically one vast wasteland into a viable agricultural region. The river provided enough irrigation water to expand the farming areas miles inland. Irrigation from the river was vital since the rainfall was often too light and irregular for any crops to fully grow. The area irrigated by the Khabour River was one of Syria's leading sources of wheat, cotton, and other agricultural products.

Khabour River Today:  This photo was taken last summer in Tel-Sakra and shows the river basin as a dry valley.

Cultivation along the river was limited to the floodplain, where traditional gravitational methods of irrigation were employed. However, in the last half of the 20th century, irrigation initiatives in Syria fundamentally altered the human and hydrologic character of the region with the broad introduction of the diesel-powered pumps, which allowed farmers to draw water from the river to irrigate lands well beyond the banks of the river. A canal (known as Skarba) was built in place along the River to bring water to Arab villages near Hassaka, but it was not active for summer irrigation.

In the early 1990s alone, two major dams were constructed along the Khabour River and plans to bring water to the Arab villages, miles away, were completed. The dams had a negative impact on the Assyrian villages, changing the character of agriculture in this region.

However, major impoundment occurred, when permits were illegally issued to drill artesian wells, around the groundwater basin. Along with the hydrologic impact of various water extraction and diversion schemes, this caused the underwater reserves to virtually dry out in the basin in and around Ras Al-Ain. Groundwater withdrawals between September 1990 and September 2000 were responsible for lowering the regional water table to the point where Khabour River is now totally dried out, a phenomenon previously unknown in recorded history.

The dry canal, aka "Skarba".

Between 1990 and 2000, over seventeen-thousand (17,000) artesian wells (deep drilled wells through which water is forced upward under pressure) were illegally approved for drilling, by corrupt government officials, to extract water some forty meters below the surface in and around Ras Al- Ain.  In addition, powerful diesel pumps were used to draw irrigation water. This act led to the drawdown of the water table and the depletion of the aquifers. The government had originally given only a few permits to drill in that area, however, a crooked government official by the name Abdul-Rahman Al-Madany, who headed the Ministry of Water Resources in Syria, was so corrupt that he received millions of dollars in bribes in order to allow an excessive number (17,000) of wells to be drilled. The level of water that fed the Khabour River began dropping at a rate of one (1) meter per year. As more wells were dug up, towards the end of last decade, water tables had dropped over forty meters (40 M) below the flow levels. It is estimated that it will take forty (40) years of seasonal rain and snow fall to replenish the aquifers that fed the river at the normal flow rate, in addition to the capping of all artesian wells that were illegally drilled.

The social and biophysical implications are grave indeed. The exhaustion of pure fresh water, adequate to the needs of tens of thousands of people who transformed this semi-arid land into a bread basket, and the changing character of irrigation in the basin had significant social and economic implications. People living in the Khabour region today earn their living working in the nearby towns and cities like Al-Hasaka, Ras-Al-Ain and Tel Tamar. Other Assyrian families rely entirely on money sent by family members and relative living in the United Sates, Europe, and Australia.

Despite the accusations that this shift in water resources was accelerated deliberately by corrupt government officials, Mr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Madany was never held accountable for his crimes and for the hardship brought upon thousands of Assyrians who still inhabit the Khabour region. He has since retired a very wealthy man.

Mr. Andrew Bet-Shlimon is the former editor of the Assyrian Star magazine.

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Conducting Research on the Assyrians of Northern Iraq

Ann-Margret “Maggie” Yonan
California

Objective

A Structural/Functional Analysis and Needs assessment to be conducted on the Assyrian community of northern Iraq, by which to gather demographic information, measure socio-economic conditions, and determine policy.

Historical Background on the Assyrians

The Assyrians are the indigenous people of Mesopotamia, (today’s northern Iraq, Western Iran, North Eastern Syria, and South Eastern Turkey) with Nineveh in northern Iraq as the main capital.   After the fall of the Assyrian empire, in 612 B.C., Assyria became a relatively small kingdom under the Parthian rule.   By 113 A.D. the small kingdom of Assyria was headed by Augaros the Osrehoenian, (king Abgar) who ruled it from Assyria’s provincial capital, Edessa, (Urhay).   By 116 A.D. parts of Mesopotamia were colonized by the Roman Empire, as far as Nisibis and Sinjar, with the frontier running down the Khabur River, from Sinjar to its confluence with the Euphrates.    In that same year, Roman coins were made in celebration of Armenia and Assyria being made a Roman province by Trajan, who marched down the Euphrates to Ctesiphon, (the Parthian capital).   Casius Dio writes, “In 117 A.D. Hadrian succeeded Trajan and gave up the province of Mesopotamia and Assyria.”   During this time, Assyria became Christianized and Syriac literature was flourishing due to the relatively autonomous state of Assyria within the Roman Empire.

During the Islamic conquest the geography of the Assyrian heartland did not change in any substantive way, but the Assyrian demographic composition changed dramatically by the sword of Islam. During the Ottoman rule in Mesopotamia, the Assyrian heartland was once again concentrated in northern Iraq, in a relatively autonomous state, encompassing Sinjar, Dohouk, Arbil, and Mosul.  

With the onset of WWI, the Christian Assyrians were caught between the British and the Turks, which resulted in the Assyrians becoming England’s “Smallest Ally.”   During the course of this war, the Russian forces, who were protecting the Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey, withdrew from the frontlines to contend with the Bolshevik Revolution back in Russia.   The Turks proceeded to massacre the Assyrians, the Armenians, and the Pontic Greeks to ethnically and religiously cleanse the “Turkish Fatherland.”    Three-quarters of the Assyrian population was slaughtered by the Ottoman Turks in the Assyrian genocide of 1914, using Kurdish mercenaries and nationalist Turks.  The effects of this war on the Assyrian community were devastating, and resulted in the Ottoman-ruled Mesopotamia being divided between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, by the British colonialists, and the Assyrian community was formally split between these newly created political regions.    In exchange for being the “smallest ally” of the British, the Assyrians were promised an independent state of their own in northern Iraq, but this never materialized.

By 1920, Iraq was declared a mandate of the League of Nations, under the United Kingdom administration.   With only one quarter of the Assyrian population surviving WWI, the Turkish massacres and the redrawing of Asia Minor’s political map, the Assyrian community of northern Iraq was reduced considerably.   Splitting the Assyrians into various politically defined regions in the Middle East impacted the cohesiveness of the Assyrian community and devastated its socio-economic life-line.   Moreover, the British promise to the Assyrians turned into the British betrayal in 1933, when Britain allowed the Iraqi army to massacre the Assyrians in Simele and other Assyrian villages in northern Iraq, using the Kurds once again.   With thousands of Assyrians slaughtered, their political leaders all but assassinated and their religious leader exiled to Cypress, the Assyrian community of northern Iraq became an insignificant and politically powerless entity within the fairly modern state of Iraq.   The demographic terrain of the Assyrian region began to change dramatically in the wake of the new Kurdish invasion of the Assyrian homeland.   Adding to this geopolitical transformation of the Assyrian community, was the political, cultural and socio-linguistic oppression waged on the Assyrians during the 35-year reign of Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime, where the Assyrian identity, culture, and language were suppressed, their political parties banned, their villages razed, and their leaders executed, in a systematic campaign to Arabize the Assyrians of Iraq.

The modern Assyrian community of northern Iraq is comprised of Mosul province, (known to the Assyrians as the Nineveh Plains) which encompasses some 16 Assyrian townships, the city of Nohadra, (re-named “Dohouk” by the Kurds) and Ankawa in Arbil province, (the ancient Assyrian Arbella).   Smaller Assyrian communities exist in other provinces such as Kirkuk, Diyala, and Diyana.    The Assyrians have traditionally lived in the Assyrian Triangle, (their traditional ancestral lands) for thousands of years, and have faced numerous religious conquests, political and cultural invasions, occupations, and geo-political changes.   Starting with WWI, WWII, the Gulf War, and the recent war on Iraq, most Assyrians have fled their homeland and living in the Diaspora, due to the on-going political and military campaigns waged on their small nation.   

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, in 1991, and the carving of the new Kurdish enclave on the Assyrian homeland, the United States further decimated the Assyrian community, by providing the Kurds with a safe-haven against “Saddam’s tyranny,” on the Assyrian homeland, enabling them to establish their own parliament, assisting them with the creation of the new political entity known as the federal region of “Kurdistan,” the new American colonial post in the Middle East.    The implementation of this newly created Kurdish federal region has split the Assyrian community once more, where half of the Assyrians now live in “Kurdistan” under the Kurdish Regional Government, (KRG) rule, and the other half in the Nineveh Plains, tied to the Central government in Baghdad.   Moreover, with the insurgency and Muslim fundamentalism in Iraq on the rise, fuelled by America’s war on Islam, the Christian Assyrians are suffering religious persecution in ways that are familiar and reminiscent of both Assyrian genocides of WWI and the Simele Massacre of 1933, being forced to abandon their homes, evacuating their communities, fleeing Iraq by the thousands, or escaping to the relative safety of the northern region under the protection of the multinational forces.

The Socio-Political Community of the Assyrians of Northern Iraq

Today’s Assyrian community of northern Iraq is composed of two strata:  1) the indigenous Assyrians living in their historical Nineveh Plains, with Mosul as its capital, under the Central government rule in Baghdad, and 2) the indigenous Assyrians living in their ancestral and historical lands of northern Iraq, (Sinjar, Ankawa, Dohouk, Diyala, Arbil and Diyana) now part of the Kurdish-controlled region.   In addition to the indigenous Assyrian population living in their ancestral lands, there is an influx of Assyrian refugees fleeing war-torn Baghdad and Basra.   These refugees can be categorized as follows:   The first group is comprised of internally displaced Assyrians fleeing the war and the ethnic-religious cleansing in Baghdad and Basra to the relative safety of the Northern provinces, now under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government and the multinational forces.   The second group is fleeing Iraq altogether with the rest of the Iraqi refugees, temporarily settling in the neighboring countries of Jordan and Syria, applying for asylum to the West, or awaiting funding and possible resettlement in their traditional lands in northern Iraq.   While the Christian Assyrians make-up only 4% of the total Iraqi population, 40-50% of Iraqi refugees living in Jordan and Syria are Assyrians.   The Diaspora Assyrians are ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and economically linked to the Assyrian community of northern Iraq in ways that are visibly and invisibly manifested in their on-going struggle to maintain their ties to the relatives back home and their ancestral lands, as well as by lobbying for political and financial support from the West.

The Assyrian community living under the Kurdish Regional Government rule in northern Iraq is the largest Assyrian community, and is known to the Assyrians as “Occupied Assyria.”   This region is headed by the Barzani and the Talabani Clan, who lead the majority-Kurdish parliament, (KRG) with a few seats reserved for minorities, such as the Assyrians, the Turkomen, the Yezidis, the Armenians, and the Mandeans.   On the one hand, the KRG has entrusted several high positions to Assyrian political ministers who have proven to be loyal Kurdish affiliates, in an attempt to prove “Kurdish Democracy.”   On the other hand, the KRG has all but confiscated the majority of Assyrian lands in order to accommodate the overwhelming Kurdish population, resettling Kurds from Europe, Turkey, and Iran on the Assyrian lands.   The majority of Assyrians around the world view the Kurdish occupiers as the old “enemy” who helped the Turkish and the Iraqi army to exterminate the Assyrians during WWI and the Simele Massacre of 1933.   Moreover, the Assyrian ministers working for the KRG are viewed by the majority of Assyrians as “Kurdish puppets,” collaborating with the Kurds to “Kurdify” Assyria and legitimize “Kurdistan.”  

In the last two years, the KRG’s Assyrian Finance Minister, Sargis Aghajan, has rebuilt 60-70 northern Assyrian villages destroyed by Kurds and Saddam’s army, and has resettled hundreds of displaced Assyrians within the KRG region, accommodating the Assyrian refugees fleeing Baghdad and Basra’s sectarian violence, building them homes, churches, schools, cultural centers, and a satellite TV station, called Ishtar, all sponsored by “Kurdistan.”   But the majority of Assyrians see this gesture as building a Kurdistan, not Assyria.  

More recently, Sargis Aghajan has been instrumental in forming the Assyrian Council of Ankawa, an Assyrian Legislative body consisting of representatives from all Assyrian constituencies in northern Iraq, and several Assyrian global political parties who share his political goals for the Assyrians of northern Iraq.   But even this council is seen by most Assyrians as an illegitimate entity installed by the Kurdish regime to Kurdify the Assyrian homeland.  

To the extent that the Assyrian community of northern Iraq has suffered numerous and on-going political and social conflicts, as well as fairly recent geopolitical changes, the modern Assyrian community is in a fragile and vulnerable state.    It is in this historical complexity and ever-changing context that the fate of the Assyrian community of northern Iraq hangs in balance between the sectarian violence afflicting Iraq, the KRG political ambitions of expansion and control of indigenous Assyrian lands, and the military occupation of Iraq by the United States.   Hence, any attempt to conduct social research on the Assyrian community of northern Iraq is a difficult task, one that requires a sensitive and careful approach, not to mention somewhat dangerous, especially in light of the political instability in Iraq, the upward advance of the insurgency towards the Mosul district, and the on-going religious persecution, ethnic cleansing, and refugee flow afflicting the tattered Assyrian nation.

Important Research Factors Relating to the Assyrian Community of northern Iraq

Some of the factors that should be given important consideration when conducting research on the Assyrian community in northern Iraq are: 1-the insurgency movement throughout the country, 2-the Kurdish Peshmerga and the PKK armed groups operating in northern Iraq, and connected to the KRG, 3-the Assyrian households living in northern Iraq, (including the newly arrived Assyrian refugees, who have traditionally maintained ties to their ancestral homeland), and 4) the Multinational corporations operating in northern Iraq, in conjunction with the multinational forces, the “new occupiers of Iraq.”

Some of the challenges faced by social scientists attempting to conduct research on the Assyrian community of northern Iraq are apparent:

• How do you design a sampling methodology in a region where there are no accurate or even available census data?
• How do you run field work in war-damaged neighborhoods where ongoing violence disrupts transportation and communication, endangers interviewers and shuts down cities under curfews and roadblocks, and still achieve exacting scientific standards?
• How do you craft questionnaires that probe attitudes on sensitive subjects without alienating skittish respondents and posing further risks to your field staff?
• How do you establish agency for the households in this region, who are vulnerable and powerless, devastated by war, destruction, and religious and political persecution, and completely dependant on their KRG overlords?  

Literature Review

In reviewing the available literature on how to conduct research in volatile regions, it becomes clear that every completed field research in conflict zones has been conducted by well-funded international organizations, specializing in social research, employing professionally trained staff, and supported by national or international governments.   In most cases, the field work is conducted by aid workers employed by such humanitarian agencies as the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and in exceptional cases, by local citizens, hired and trained by professional agencies to conduct surveys.  In nearly every case, the methodologies used are designed by professional research companies in conjunction with local partners, who develop focus groups, provide professional moderators, translators, and data interpreters.   The majority of available data analysis is interpreted by professional social scientists and anthropologists, hired by governmental and non-governmental organizations, (NGOs) or research institutes, and the publications are available on the websites of many of these large organizations.  

The largest and most well-known organizations who have conducted most of the field research in war-zone regions are: The International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, (UNRWA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Fafo Institute for Social Research, funded by the Norwegian government.   Large surveys, such as the nation-wide Iraq Living conditions survey (UNDP 2005), conducted in 2004 by Fafo and the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Iraq (COSIT) provide comprehensive data on the living conditions of Iraqi households, but these large-scale surveys are time-consuming and significantly more difficult, and potentially dangerous to complete.   Moreover, they lack ethnographic data by which one can obtain information on the Assyrian community of northern Iraq.  

The most comprehensive and elaborate social research in conflict zones has been conducted by the Fafo Research Foundation.  Their website boasts several research projects launched in conflict regions such as the Middle East, East and West Africa, and Eastern Europe.   One of their most notable staff, Dr. Kathleen Jennings, has recently published her review of some of these research projects conducted in conflict zones, and she provides a detailed and thorough analysis in her abstract, “The War Zone as Social Space:   Social Research in Conflict Zones.”

Dr. Jennings defines conflict zones as social spaces.   In the introductory paragraph of her analysis she writes, “As seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990’s, and in Iraq and Afghanistan today, it may be difficult to say with any certainty whether a conflict is in fact over, even once a political compromise or process is agreed.   Conflict zones are sites of both change and continuity.   At the same time, the chronic nature of many post-Cold War conflicts highlights how depressingly normal a situation of conflict may become for the affected population.” (Jennings 2007:1).  

Jennings admits that much of what we know about conflict is second-hand and descriptive, as the stories of participants and survivors of conflict are told to journalists, aid-workers, and officials concerned with the political and economic aspects of war.  This suggests that social research in conflict zones has been a fairly recent trend and more studies are needed to establish working models for social researchers, and to provide data by which we can assess conflict-affected populations.

Jennings maintains that violent conflict is often represented and understood as an exceptional phenomenon.   “This is merited, given what comes with war: large-scale death, destruction, refugee flows, political instability, humanitarian crisis, and long-lasting socio-economic impacts.   Yet the “exceptionalism” associated with violent conflict obscures two important points:   the first is that, in chronic conflict zones, conflict is not exceptional.   It might instead be called the “new normal,” often in quite resilient and remarkable ways.” (Jennings 2007:7).    This means conflict is not only prolonged to sustain the interests of those perpetrating war, but the affected population adapts to this “new normal” by adopting or inventing new coping mechanisms by which to survive.

Jennings divides the actors in conflict regions into three distinct groups:   The Armed Groups, the Elite Networks, and the Households.   She defines the term “armed groups” as a non-state, armed movement, fighting the government, and comprising anything from disciplined, military-style organizations, to armed wings of political or religious movements.  She posits that the way armed groups have been defined and understood by analysts and policy-makers, has always been affected by geopolitics.    “Presently the geopolitical current most relevant to the study and understanding of armed groups is the “global war on terror”.   Even at the time of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many armed groups were also considered to be terrorist organizations.” (Jennings 2007:10).   Among the armed groups she lists, who operate in various countries and who are labeled “Terrorist Groups,” is the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, (PKK) who are nowadays the subject of most news articles, fighting the Turkish government along Iraq’s northern border with Turkey.   The KRG denies any affiliation with this “rogue” group, yet their name bares the word “Kurdistan” as opposed to the Kurdish Worker’s Party, which would encompass all the Kurds of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.   Taking into consideration the definitions of armed groups and their motives as described by Jennings, the military power behind Kurdistan’s power in northern Iraq is the PKK.   In that sense, the PKK’s role is to expand and sustain the conflict for the KRG in northern Iraq while the officially recognized Kurdish Peshmerga armed group secures the expansion and annexation of the Kurdish region.   Consequently, any attempt to conduct research on the Assyrian community in this region, is dangerous and politically complex, considering how many armed groups operate in this conflict zone.  

Jennings’s analyses of the motive of armed groups in conflict zones is based on the “greed and grievance” debate, formulated by her Fafo colleagues Berdal and Malone  where “the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary civil conflicts has been understudied, despite the fact that as the editors argue, economic considerations often shape the calculations and behavior of the parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular war economy and a distinct dynamic of conflict.”(Jennings 2007:12).    This would explain the immense economic boom in the Kurdistan region during the course of the War on Iraq, where the Iraqi economy is globalized through the Kurdish regional structure.   Jennings adds, “Profit motive can be an important, if not primary factor determining the advent, continuation, and institutionalization of violent conflict; and that where conflict facilitates profit, the pursuit of economic interests supplements-and may even supplant-the traditional aim of war, namely defeating the enemy.”  (Jennings 2007:12).   She argues that attacks against military targets and infrastructure are thus accompanied (or replace) by attacks intended to appropriate and exert control over resource-rich areas, trade routes, and aid distribution, which in the case of northern Iraq is comprised of several different actors, not only consisting of Kurdish armed groups, but the US forces, as well, all of whom are involved in the process of gaining political dominance of northern Iraq, and economic control over resource-rich areas.   Hence in this particular scenario, America sustains the conflict, by creating “the war on terror,” and to that extent, the beneficiaries of the war on the oil-rich and strategically important Iraq are the American occupiers and their Kurdish emissaries.

As with armed groups, much of the policy and analytical work on elite networks, according to Jennings, “has focused on the important role of resource exploitation.   An elite network is not a single actor per se, but a group encompassing actors, relationships, transactions, and resource flows.” (Jennings 2007:21).   She maintains that the elite networks, working in conjunction with regime actors, state military forces, non-state armed groups, and corporations, often play key roles in transporting goods and services, and brokering the commodity chain of natural resources coming from conflict zones or otherwise poor and insecure states.   “They provide a link between local production and global markets in arms, drugs, diamonds, timber, finance, and people.” (Jennings 2007:21).   Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) characterize this overlap as la politique du venture, or “the politics of the belly” in which the relationship between economic accumulation and tenure of political power does not preclude the conduct of illicit activities by the networked actors outside formal power structures.   The creation of the so-called “federal region of Kurdistan” in 1991 then, was by design, and that such an accommodation was a preamble for the war on Iraq in 2003.   To the extent in which the Kurdish elite networks have facilitated the multi-national corporate greed, and are serving as a vehicle for both cultural representations and goods of foreign origin, they play a key role in the process of globalization.   This neo-patrimonialism, according to Jennings consists of the privatization of the public which has two consequences: “the first is that political power, instead of having the impersonal and abstract character of legal-rational domination, specific to the modern state, is on the contrary personal power.   While the second is that politics becomes a kind of business, as it is political resources which give access to economic resources: politics is reduced to economies and recovers the depersonalized character inherent in the market.” (Jennings 2007:28).

The last group discussed by Jennings, are the Households, which she admits is the group least studied.   She posits that work on households in conflict mostly comes from anthropologists, epidemiologists, demographers, and to a much lesser extent, political scientists and economists.   Much of the survey work being done on households in conflict areas is conducted for the purpose of assessing humanitarian needs and/or impact.   “This work is crucial to effectively tailor policy and aid responses in crisis situations, and its relative neglect by both researchers and donors is highly problematic.   Much of the debate in this area still circulates on developing methodologies and indicators, and implies how much work remains to be done.”  (Jennings 2007:29).   This answers the question of why every completed research on households in conflict areas is conducted by humanitarian agencies and their aid workers, and to that extent, acceptable standards of social research and methodologies are not yet fully developed.

Jennings proposes that if we conceive of conflict zones as social space, then research into conflict should be conducted in an empirical manner, which would require researchers to observe connections, commonalities, and dissimilarities among the various elements active in a conflict zone, such as the relationships within and between armed groups, elite networks, and households and individuals.  This would enhance the effectiveness of research and policy.   In other words, conducting any kind of research on the Assyrian community in northern Iraq must entail observing the entire area in which the Assyrian households live and studying connections formed or are forming between the Assyrians and their Kurdish political overlords, the Kurdish elite networks, as well as the occupying American forces operating in conjunction with the multi-national corporations.   She uses as an example “the elite networks profitably” linking global arms, financial, and commodity markets to local production and consumption, which means that these households are largely impacted by the goods and services the American occupiers and the Kurdish elite networks produce, trade, and contract in northern Iraq.      She advises that it is a mistake to assume that the economic boom in conflict regions consists of or is controlled exclusively by foreign opportunists.   Rather, these elite networks are often embedded in their community and built on existing formal and informal authority structures within their regions.

A great deal of information has come out of the Kurdish region lately in the form of articles written by independent journalists reporting the immense corruption within the KRG, and how the Kurdish elites are siphoning both material and capital wealth to those who support them, while the rest of the Kurds struggle to survive. A great example of this is illustrated in an article titled, “Corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan” by Kate Clark, in which she writes, “Kurdistan's budget is large - more than $6bn last year - the region's share of Iraq's oil revenues. But there is a growing gap between ordinary Kurds and the political elite.”   (Kurdish Media: 1/10/2008).   There is no question that the Assyrians who are affiliated with the KRG are also profiting economically, and this is manifested in their life-styles, their newly acquired wealth and positions in the KRG, as well as the loyalty to the Kurdish plans for northern Iraq.    To that extent, the Assyrian households who live in this region, must either cooperate and become dependent upon them or fail to survive politically and economically.   While ordinary Kurds suffer economically, the Assyrians, who are completely dependant upon their Kurdish overlords, are living below the poverty level, and their communities are plagued with joblessness and hopelessness, similar to America’s ghettos.

Jennings also draws a link between the elite networks and the armed groups that serve them, by stating that “Armed groups also tend to establish relationships with, or constitute their own networks to market the exploitable resources and their control and ensure access to arms and other material.”   (Jennings 2007:17).   In many articles published in independent Kurdish papers, we read statements from former Kurdish Peshmergas and former KRG political prisoners who describe how the Kurdish elite networks provide armed groups with material wealth such as lands and capital in exchange for their support to sustain Kurdish power in northern Iraq.   Hence, it would be difficult to conduct accurate research using a sample survey by which to assess the socio-economic conditions of the Assyrians in northern Iraq without first gaining insight into the regional economic structure upon which the Assyrian households depend for their existence.

Jennings asserts that understanding conflict zones as social space may help to restore agency to those involved in or affected by conflict.   To the extent in which the different actors in conflict have varying interests, including simple survival, the advancement of political and social agendas, status and profit, it is crucial to examine the interests, motives, and strategies of those acting within conflict zones in order to understand if the Assyrian households could be put in a position of power to be able to assume agency if a research project is launched in their community.   In the case of the Assyrian households, they can only be empowered to assume agency if they are provided total independence within an Assyrian safe-haven, outside the Kurdish rule and influence.   Otherwise, agency for the Assyrian households would be difficult to achieve, given the fact that the KRG is totally imbedded in every aspect of Assyrian life in the Kurdish controlled region, and Kurdish officials operate in every Assyrian village, and dictate the course of political and social decisions, conferences, caucuses, ethno-religious events, and even local elections.    This is apparent in many of the events held in northern Iraq, where Kurdish officials are present in every Assyrian gathering, from eulogies, to memorials, to social or political meetings as well as the formation of the recent Assyrian Council in Ankawa.   Moreover, many Kurdish ministers treat the Assyrians as third-class citizens, and have made blatant and hostile remarks about the Assyrian rights within the Kurdish-controlled region, such as the recent statement by Mulla Bakhtiyar, who recently said, “It is known that nations have the legal right to establish their own states or regions if they had historic and geographical lands; however, the Turkomen and Assyrians are residing in Kurdistan and they have full citizenship rights in it, but they do not own/have any lands in Kurdistan and/or in Iraq." Mulla Bakhtiyar, head of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, (PUK) under Jalal Talabani, (Iraqi president) as quoted in the Al-Malaf Press, October 22, 2007.   No other nation or people have more valid historical and geographical reality in northern Iraq than the Assyrians, yet Mulla Bakhtiyar is emboldened by the Kurdish power that is propped-up in Iraq by the American colonialists.

Methodology

Given the political complexities and the dangerous and unstable circumstances in which the Assyrians of northern Iraq find themselves currently, it would be difficult if not impossible for an individual or group of Assyrians to launch an independent research project in the Assyrian community of northern Iraq, to empower the Assyrian households to assume agency, and to obtain accurate data on their living conditions, without risking intimidation and interruption from the Kurdish authorities, who are likely to be suspicious and want to intervene, disrupt, or even influence the research project.   It is vital that an independent, well-funded, professional and authoritative research organization be assigned to conduct such important research and be able to carry it through, without fear of reprisal from various formal and informal Kurdish authorities operating in northern Iraq.   This type of large-scale and sensitive project can only be launched by such groups as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, (UNRWA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), working in conjunction with the Fafo Institute for Social Research.  Only such organizations can truly be independent and empowered to perform such exacting and potentially dangerous work, in an uninterrupted and undeterred environment, where researchers, aid workers, data, and facilities can be protected and secured through a formal and legitimate structure which would enable the Assyrian households to assume agency.

A conflict zone, being a complex and multi-dimensional social space, requires research that is well-mapped and staged, incorporating several methods and techniques.   Hence, the following methodology is proposed:

Stage I

In the initial stage, the research project must entail a structural/functional analysis in the target region.   This would consist of a period of empirical observation and data analysis to determine the Assyrian social structure within the conflict region.  It is crucial to identify all the players, such as the regional government, military forces, corporations, private security forces, armed groups, as well as international and humanitarian agencies operating in the region, and to analyze the relationships between all these groups, and map the playing field.

Stage II

To the extent researchers may not have a choice who they might engage in the research, (be it officials, local, regional, and international bureaucrats) it is important to understand the social environment before conducting research.   At this stage it will be necessary to meet with key players to establish the agency, the security system that will guarantee the safety of the research project, the agency, the staff and the data, and to secure the research project through the American military operations in northern Iraq.

Stage III

At this stage, the choice of which humanitarian and professional research agencies from among the many large and well-established organizations must be established.   The ICRC working in conjunction with the Fafo Institute is the most likely choice for the Assyrian community in northern Iraq.   The ICRC is the only trusted humanitarian agency in Iraq to launch large-scale projects.   The Fafo institute has the most experience in conducting social research on ethnic groups, and is not only independent but funded by the Norwegian government to conduct research throughout conflict zones.   The choice of these two organizations would be the most expedient, efficient, and cost-effective.

Stage IV

At this stage, all the precautionary measures must be established by the research committee to allow for a sample design to be specifically tailored to the Assyrian community, taking into consideration the Assyrian religious and cultural mores, the linguistic specifications, and regional laws operating in northern Iraq.

Stage V:  Opinion Survey

The Questionnaire-The opinion survey would be designed to question Assyrian households on their war experiences and would incorporate questions on their living conditions within each strata. The questionnaire would be developed by a professional research company, in consultation with the ICRC, and would include questions needed to assess the following topics:

• Characteristics of the community (infrastructure, access to services)
• Demographic characteristics (sex, age, marital status, migration, fertility, infant and child mortality, maternal mortality)
• Housing and amenities
• Household possessions
• Household income
• Labor force and sources of income, including agriculture
• Education (enrollment, attendance, literacy, achieved level of education)
• Health (state of health, reproductive health, access to services)
• Security
• Autonomy

The survey being a multi-topic survey, would allow cross-cutting analysis of the distribution of living conditions along a range of dimensions, and can therefore provide identification of vulnerable groups, geographic disparities and analysis of particular parts of the population, such as IDPs, (internally displaced individuals).

Sample Design-selected by a stratified, multi-stage cluster sampling method.   The sample must be stratified to ensure representation from each of the principal Assyrian regions within the three governorates, (the KRG-controlled governorates of Arbil and Nohadra/Dohouk, and the non-KRG controlled governorate of Mosul).   A local partner hired to randomly select small geographic units within these two strata can achieve a better outcome.    

Within households, respondents would be selected using a kish grid (a respondent key that employs a combination of random numbers, alphabet codes and the number of available members in a household to identify the appropriate respondent) or the birthday criterion (a respondent selection process that employs dates of birth to determine appropriate respondent).   The demographic distribution of the surveyed respondents would be compared with the best available census data on education, age, household type and occupation that can be obtained from the Assyrian church records.  

- Survey Administration

The survey would be administered by the ICRC, with the assistance of a professional research group and local research partner.   Interviews would be conducted by the Red Cross or Red Crescent staff.   The professional research company would provide the training.

- Focus Groups

The focus groups would provide a relatively unstructured environment for people to discuss their war experiences freely, express their views on the geo-political changes within each community structure, the security situation, as well as the freedom to establish Assyrian cultural and academic institutions important in maintaining religious rites, linguistic and social traditions of the Assyrians.   In each governorate, 3-5 focus groups should be organized   The participants should be  recruited by Red Cross or Red Crescent staff, based on guidelines provided by a professional research organization.

The local research company should provide a professional moderator, who facilitates the discussions using the same guidelines.   The discussions should be held in focus-group facilities, school classrooms, hotel rooms, and even in the open air, if, for example, they involved guerrilla fighters.   ICRC, the Red Cross/Red Crescent and a professional Research staff would observe and listen from an adjoining location, with simultaneous translation in English.

- The Sample

The sample of the survey should be a comparatively standard two-stage cluster design. In the Ninveh Plains, the survey should be based on the 1997 census of Iraq. For the other two governorates of Arbil and Dohouk, where the 1997 census was not conducted, sampling frames should be based on lists of localities compiled by the local statistical offices.    The first stage of the sample should be selected with probability proportionate to the number of households in each unit (PPS). Each selected Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) should be mapped, all households listed, and 10 households randomly selected in each PSU.   Due to population growth, migration, displacement and exodus of the Assyrians, it is likely that the 1997 census does not accurately represent the population distribution of all three governorates.    A list of resettled Assyrians as well as a list of IDPs should be obtained from the Ankawa Council.   But parts of the population will most likely not be covered, in particular, recently displaced people who have moved to new areas.

- Fieldwork

ICRC staff would have to be extensively trained in implementing the survey tool by researchers from the Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies (Fafo AIS). The first round of training should take place within KRG controlled region under the protection of US military units operating in northern Iraq.   Core staff from ICRC’s offices in each governorate should be present under Fafo’s supervision.   Fieldwork should be completed within two months in the Mosul Governorate. Data collection in the Governorates of Arbil and Dohouk can be completed afterwards for comparison reasons.

After each selected PSU had been mapped and listed, interviewers should be sent to 10 selected households. Interviewers can be organized in teams of five, with individual supervisors who continuously provide guidance and check the quality of all incoming interviews. Furthermore, supervisors from Fafo staff should also visit the interviewer teams.   Upon completion of the interviews, the information should be sent to the governorate office for registration and inspection, then to the Ankawa main office for coding and data entry. During the data entry process, extensive quality control should be implemented, and questionnaires should be sent back to the Fafo headquarters in Oslo.   Completed data files should be continuously sent to Fafo’s headquarters in Oslo, Norway, where further quality checks can be implemented.

Areas Covered by the Survey-The survey would examine housing conditions, the availability of infrastructure and services, and environmental issues. The survey first must look at the delivery of basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation, emphasizing not only households’ access to networks but also on the quality and stability of supply.

The households’ dwellings should be described with reference to the type, size, number of people in dwelling, and tenure arrangements, in order to provide information pertaining to the space in which individuals live. Furthermore, damages to dwellings caused by acts of war or lack of maintenance should be described and analyzed in relation to households’ plans and states of repair. The survey should also describe individuals’ satisfaction with different aspects of housing and the environment in close vicinity to the dwelling. The survey must look at households’ access to social services, focusing mainly on health and education services. All analysis would be done in relation to households’ geographical place of residence and socio-economic status.

The survey must describe and analyze the characteristics of the Assyrian population in northern Iraq. The dynamics of any population can be described in terms of births, deaths, and migration, paying specific attention to the population’s age and gender structure. Particular emphasis should be placed on infant and child mortality in the Assyrian community. The demographic effects of war and strife should also be discussed.

The survey would consider the supply, demand, and quality of education in the Assyrian community. The supply of education encompasses physical infrastructure and public spending; demand is related to various aspects of enrollment; and the quality of education refers to how the system works internally. Special emphasis should be given to enrolment levels and characteristics, as well as to the achieved education and literacy levels in the adult population. The geographic and socio-economic differentiation of educational achievements should be considered.   The survey should deal with labor-force participation and employment. The analysis would outline some of the difficulties inherent in estimating employment and unemployment in an economy like northern Iraq, and would consider aspects of both visible and hidden underemployment. The distribution of occupation and industries in northern Iraq should also be addressed.   The survey should describe the result of work, specifically the income and wealth of households. Data collected on household income, the material possessions of households, and subjective measures of destitution and poverty can be used to portray income patterns, which in turn would lead to an analysis of inequality. The data obtained may not allow for a full-fledged poverty analysis, but insight into the characteristics of poverty in the Assyrian community of northern Iraq can be gained through an analysis of how people perceive their situation.   The survey should include questions on Assyrian autonomy.   The households should be asked whether they would like to form an Assyrian autonomous region on their traditional ancestral lands. 

In all cases, the interviews must be conducted face to face, using a standard questionnaire, developed by professional research organizations.   Some 10 percent of the questions should be contextual, and in some cases unique to the governorate.

Conclusion
           
This research project would be the first of its kind conducted exclusively on the Assyrian community in northern Iraq.    This research would serve many purposes:

• Define the geopolitical Assyrian community within the current Iraqi context.
•  Identify the institutional structures by which the Assyrian community functions
•  Gather statistical information by which to measure the demographics of the Assyrian community within the three governorates
• Identify the geographic disparities within each of the three governorate structure
• Determine the overall socio-economic needs of the Assyrian population in the northern Iraq region.
• Identify the Assyrian political structure operating in northern Iraq
• Establish the geographical outline of an autonomous, self-administered region for the Assyrians in northern Iraq.
• Effectively tailor policy for long-term sustainability of the Assyrian community of northern Iraq within an autonomous structure.

Bibliography

Al-Malaf Press, October 22, 2007.

Bayart, Jean Francois, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou.   1999.   The Criminalization of the State in Africa.   Oxford.  

Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone (editors).  2000.   Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas and Civil Wars.   Boulder.

Casius Dio.  LXVIII, 24, 1-2: 105

Clark, Kate.  Corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish Media: 1/10/2008

Jennings, Kathleen M.   The War Zone as Social Space: Social Research in Conflict Zones.   Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies-Norway.   2007.

United Nations Development Program.   Iraq Living Conditions Survey, Baghdad.  Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) under the Ministry of Planning and Development in cooperation with (UNDP) and Fafo-AIS.   2005.

ICRC, (International Committee of the Red Cross.  The People on War Project. Greenburg Research.  Geneva. 1999.

Assyrian Commentator Detained, Later Released, by KDP

(ZNDA: Mosul)  On Sunday, 17 February around 6:30 pm, the Assyrian Church of the East deacon and writer Johnny Khoshaba al-Rekani was abducted from his home in the town of Telkepe (Telkaif) in the Nineveh Governorate in north Iraq by members of the KDP peshmerga loyal to the Kurdish President Masoud Barazani.

The peshmerga abducted Mr. Khoshaba from his home in the Nineveh Governorate and transferred him to Sekrene, a high-security prison facility near Sarsink, north of Dohuk in the Dohuk Governorate which is under the Kurdish control. Mr. Khoshaba was charged with criticising the Kurdish authorities and KRG Finance Minister Sargis Aghajan. He was also warned against writing about the corruption and sex scandals of the Assyrian Church of the East Bishop Ishaq Khamis and the bishop's loyalty to the Kurdish authorities.

Mr. al-Rekani uses his personal web site "alSarkha" (The Outcry) at alsarkha.uv.ro to bring attention to the unfairness of the Kurdish policies against the Assyrians.  Mr. al-Rekani also comments on how Kurdish officials exploit certain Assyrians to achieve their plans.  Previously, he has also used his website to report on the scandals involving the clergymen in northern Iraq.  Mr. al-Rekani writes, in one case, that he has tried contacting Patriarch Mar Dinkha IV about the corruption and scandals in his church when the patriarch visited northern Iraq, but to no avail.

The prison where Mr. Khoshaba was detained informed his immediate family that in order to secure his release, they must obtain a letter from Priest Yousip Benyamin requesting that all charges be dropped.  Mr. Khoshaba's family declined the request on the ground that " if that's what it takes to have our son released, we would rather he stay there than beg a corrupt and evil priest!"

Mr. Khoshaba was released on Thursday, 21 February.

The following is Zinda Magazine's partial English translation of an essay written by Mr. Khoshaba on 3 February 2008 in Telkaif in North Iraq.  To view the entire essay in Arabic click here.

              al-Sarkha … A Candle to the Hearts of the Living and a Sword in the Grip of the Ignorant

The ongoing events in our church in Dohuk is a natural reaction to the works done by the evil Bishop Ishaq. It is the expected outcome of what our parish has done there because of the wickedness that found its way spreading through our churches, wasted ways to reduce encroachment around the clean consciences...

I don't want to get deeper into what is happening in Dohuk, because that is not the reason for writing this article.  I have been absent in all those events and know how some parties try to misuse the name of alSarkha to taget this or that. The peron who uses al-Sarkha the most to fulfill the missions within his dark self is Bishop Ishaq… Bishop Ishaq wants to heat some of those who opposed him even before I released al-Sarkha or before I publish the scandal on several websites on the Internet, so he uses my name to settle old disputes with few people, among them Rev. Philip where he refers to as a 'supporter of Johnn'y or 'supports alSarkha' even though I mentioned in an earlier article that Rev. Philip has nothing to do with anything …
  
Before I get into more detail, I need to say that this is not in defense of Rev. Philip because he is capable of defending himself (if there was indeed something that needed to be defended), but I say all this to bring out the truth only, and nothing but the truth even if it was in the benefit of some and not to the benefit of others. 

To Ishaq, the deceptive bishop who is infested with the repugnant odor of adultery, I say, before you use my outcry [al-Sarkha] to incriminate anyone who does not walk the way you wish, or to make it a sword to cut the heads of those who do not bow to your abomination, look into the mirror and ask your reflection this: "Is what al-Sarkha mentions a horrifying nightmare that attacks you in the dusk of your nights or is it its truth that is eating you away in your deep conscious that you find no way out of, only to attack it, conspire against it or tempt this and that with your money to cover up for the collapse of your conscious… For it was you yesterday who were with your relative in that wicked bed, a fact known to those closest to you. It is you that used the adulteress who was searching repentance and you blemished her in that room across the alter by what she wanted to get rid of. It is you that uses the religious façade to make the alter a propaganda forum for certain politicians and it is you that makes sure to benefit from people like Sargis [Aghajan] to secure esteem position and abundance of money. It is you who uses his money to incite this against that, within your flock, so you would live in peace and calm using the divide and rule principle. Therefore, from this all, don't you see that it is you who attached a note to his back offering the price of your conscious, your specifics and the types of services that you might offer for he who pays with dollars…

Click book cover to learn more.

You [Bishop Ishaq] say that Rev. Philip supports Johnny, so here is the bitter truth that you avoid listening to… Rev. Philip did not receive anything from me with the exception of the paper that I sent to all the priests in Dohuk by name and in sealed envelopes… I did not sit with him on any day before I published the scandal. He did not offer any services whether before or after I published the scandal. All he did is that he listened to me only. During Patriarch [Mar Dinkha]'s visit he did not offer any help and said that he could not help me. However, he said that he knows who could and gave me the cell phone number of Rev. Shlimon of the church in Sarsink so I contacted him and he welcomed me and was approachable regarding the information that incriminate you. He [Rev. Shlimon] asked me to meet with him and so I did indeed. I went to his old home in Sarsink with one of my relatives. I sat with him and we had lunch, then he took us to the old church in Sarsink that was being remodeled at the time. I sat with him alone in a room on the second floor and told him everything and he was receptive to every word that I said and he offered to do his best to help me to reach the Patriarch. He picked up his phone and contacted Rev. Emmanuel [Baito Youkhanna] who was accompanying the Patriarch (as I know he serves one of our churches in Germany) and spoke with him and told him that I was sitting in his home. He [Rev. Emmanuel] recognized me well even though I had never encountered him from the scandal of Bishop Ishaq that I published. He welcomed the issue and because he was in good relations with Mar Narsai, Bishop of Lebanon and Europe, he was going to inform the bishop and he in turn could set an appointment with the Patriarch. He [Rev. Emmanuel] promised to call Rev. Shlimon and give him the answer as soon as possible. Here was the result of my meeting with Rev. Shlimon:  neither Rev. Shlimon, nor Rev. Emmanuel or Mar Narsai did anything and it seems that each was worried about what is hidden behind his own cross. As we left Rev. Shlimon's home, my relative asked about our conversation and I told him that every one of our priests has something against Bishop Ishaq and wants to get rid of him, but does not dare to do anything about it.  They see in Johnny the mean that would liberate them from the dictator bishop. I mentioned this incident to bring out the truth only and not to defend a person and that what Rev. Philip presented does not escalate to even one-fourth of what was presented by others. Furthermore, I wanted to show how some people were before they benefited from their Bishop Ishaq and afterwords. Greeting Rev. Shlimon and the bringing out the truth has now turned to ignoring me and avoiding my presence. I met Rev. Shlimon twice two months ago: first in one of Dohuk's hospitals and the other time in Telkaif where he was sitting in one of those Sargisi [belonging to Sargis Aghajan] cars that he got from his master, Ishaq. I am the same person and nothing new has happened to deny today what he believed yesterday. What changed is he joined the entourage of his master Ishaq under the leadership of their head, Sargis [Aghajan].

…I would like to send a message to all readers of al-Sarkha and those who follow it up that I will not allow anyone to use al-Sarkha to accomplish what he personally desires, whether the person is a religious man or part of the flock or nation.  Such people resemble the likeness of Rev. Shlimon; how he was happy with all the dreadfulness of his Ishaq and what he became after he bagan to benefit from him [Bishop Ishaq]. Al-Sarkha was founded to bring out the truth and expose the corruption under which our holy churches and great nation is succumbing… al-Sarkha is founded to cleanse our churches from the rotten minds that hide behind the cross; the rotten minds that recognize faith only through their mouths and not through their deeds…

US Ambassador Ryan Crocker Affirms Significance of Art. 125 for Iraqi Minorities

Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project
Washington, DC
info@iraqdemocracyproject.org
Tel: (202) 378-8082
Fax: 1 (800) 355-7228
Web: www.iraqdemocracyproject.org

For Immeidate Release                                                                                                                                        19 February 2008

In late 2007 US Ambassador Ryan Crocker affirmed the significance of Art. 125 for Iraq’s developing system of federalism, when responding to questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about minorities and their goal for a federal unit in the Nineveh Plain.

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked about the political viability and response of the Iraqi government to the Art. 125/Nineveh Plain solution for minorities.  Sen. Biden prefaced his question to Amb. Crocker stating, “Some Iraqi parliamentarians have called for the creation of an autonomous region in the Nineveh Plains, home to a disproportionate number of Iraqi minorities, including Assyrians, Turkmen and Yazidis.”

Amb. Crocker’s response was clear-cut, writing that, “Some Iraqi parliamentarians and local politicians in Ninawa have called for an autonomous region in Ninawa province, citing Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution.  Iraqi citizens can pursue the creation of a separate administrative region through processes consistent with this article.”

“Senator Joseph Biden’s committee is clearly investigating issues of federalism in Iraq that includes accounting for minorities, specifically Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriacs among others. Amb Ryan Crocker’s affirmation that politicians in Ninawa are trying to advance this agenda is a reflection of their success in profiling this goal”, said ISDP’s Project Director, Michael Youash.

The Iraqi Minorities Council, comprising an array of Iraq’s most vulnerable minorities, chaired by Dr. Hunain Al-Qaddo, is a strong voice for the creation of such a unit.  The Assyrian Democratic Movement was the first to champion this idea, but now virtually all other Iraqi-based minority political groups are actively pursuing this agenda.

Through meetings, proposals, and constant communication with relevant government officials, ISDP is working with Iraqi partners promoting the Art. 125/Nineveh Plain solution.  ISDP sees clearly that the goal of these minorities is a stronger more integrated Iraq, through federalism. The goal is true decentralization without partition, which the minority peoples overwhelmingly support.

“Some question the Art. 125 solution on the basis of misunderstandings of its significance in relation to Iraq’s developing federal system. Amb. Ryan Crocker’s response puts any doubts to rest.  ISDP is working to ensure that  senior-most US decision-makers are being equipped to deal with matters most vital to the survival of minorities in their homeland; the establishment of the Nineveh Plain Administrative Unit in accordance with Art. 125 of the Iraqi Constitution is a central part of that mission”, said Youash.

AGC Opens Office in Syria

Assyrian General Conference - Damascus Office
Kornesh Altejara
Shaban Building # 35
Damascus, Syria

For Immeidate Release                                                                                                                               5 February 2008

The office of the Assyrian General Conference has opened its doors in the Syrian Arab Republic, in the city of Damascus. The AGC office will be a channel of communication for our Assyrian community. It will contribute to alleviating their suffering and work diligently to achieve our goals as Assyrians.

We value the position of the Syrian government and thank them for granting us the opportunity to open our office, as well as thank the Syrian people for their nobility in welcoming the Iraqi people under the current situation.

Assyrian General Conference - Damascus office.

AAS-Iraq Relief Project Helps 400 Families in al-Zenjili

Michael E Bradley, Administrator, AAS-A
T: 510-527-9997
F: 510-527-6633
administrator@assyrianaid.org

For Immeidate Release                                                                                                                                 8 February 2008

The Assyrian Aid Society-Iraq, sister organization of the Assyrian Aid Society of America, has completed a relief project supporting 400 families in Al-Zenjili, Mosul, site of a recent devastating terrorist bombing that claimed many innocent lives.

Accompanying this cover page is a first person account from the AAS-Iraq Relief Delegation to Al-Zenjili.

This project was funded entirely by the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany.

The Assyrian Aid Society of America is a charitable organization recognized by the State of California and the government of the United States of America, dedicated to assisting needy Christian Assyrians in Northern Iraq and around the world. Over the past 15 years AAS-A has raised over $4 million to, with its sister organization, the Assyrian Aid Society – Iraq, to build schools, staff and supply medical clinics, facilitate life-saving surgeries, rebuild homes, irrigate farmlands, bring electricity to villages, and implement a host of other vital programs and services.

The following is a first person account by the AAS-IRAQ relief delegation to al-Zenjile, Mosul:

On Saturday February 2, 2008, a delegation from the Assyrian Aid Society-Iraq distributed humanitarian aid to the people in the destroyed area of Al-Zingili, Mosul, site of a recent terrorist bombing that claimed many innocent lives Much more was distributed than what was originally planned because of the great need.

Words are incapable of expressing the magnitude of the tragedy that happened in that region. This was the first opportunity for humanitarian aids to be distributed following the attack. With the assistance of the mayor and the people of the area, the delegation distributed by hand from street to street the essential materials to more than 400 stricken families. Our vehicles drove through the entire area and saw all of the families to give the assistance they so desperately needed.

The delegation was shocked to see the true extent of the devastation from the bombing. People of the area pointed out where two-story houses had been but there was nothing left to even suggest it had been a house or a building at all.

The local population had not expected this level of bombardment. Official authorities had instructed them to stay in their homes, advising them to leave their windows open so as to minimize the breaking of glass from blasts. But instead of suffering simple broken windows, these houses were completely destroyed and became tombs with human remains mixed with debris. The most dramatic story was the discovery of the body of a deceased mother with her dead baby in her arms.

We entered the houses with great difficulty because of the large amount of debris. We listened to many tragic stories, with each house having a more painful story than the one before it. Some had a dead father or mother or brother or sister, and some had lost more than one person.

But the most affecting scene was when we saw a child among the ruins, as his parents cleared the way for us to enter their home. They asked us to deliver their tragic story to the Government so that the authorities consider their unbearable situation and lend help, especially in this cold winter and their home without walls or windows for protection. The blast destroyed in seconds what had taken them years to build.

A father was beseeching us to come and photograph his infant son with a broken arm, thrown by the blast along with three other wounded brothers. A little girl wept after she saw us and then ran away because she was still in shock since the day of the explosion.

There were many such painful stories but our words will not be as expressive as the silence in the faces of children and the old people of Al-Zingili. Our words also will not reflect the cries of women and children showing their thanks and gratitude on that February afternoon.

One of the Sheiks said to us, “This aid will not bring back what we lost, a son or relative or house, but it is a good gesture from you and a token of love which introduced joy in our heart. Perhaps by you, others will pay attention to us. God bless you and keep you.”

The humanitarian distribution continued late into the afternoon. At each house we entered, we were greeted with expressions of gratitude, blessings, and thanks to everyone who contributed to this work.

The AAS-Iraq delegation to Al-Zenjili, Mosul
Report prepared by Christina Batto, AAS-Iraq, Dohuk, Iraq

Fragments of Oldest Christian Manuscript Found in Egypt

Written in 411 AD in Syriac, the text was hidden for over
1,000 years in a vault used to store olive oil.

Courtesy of the Art Newspaper
18 February 2008
By Martin Baily

The Monastery of Deir al-Surian

(ZNDA: Cairo)  Fragments of the earliest dated Christian literary manuscript have been found at Deir al-Surian, an ancient monastery in the Egyptian desert. Dating from 411 AD, these were discovered under a collapsed floor of a ninth-century tower. The fragments are from the final page of a codex written in Syriac (an Eastern Aramaic language) which was acquired by the British Museum library in the 19th century.

Few manuscripts have had such an astonishing history. In 1847, British Museum librarian William Cureton said that “among all the curiosities of literature, I know of none more remarkable than the fate of this matchless volume”. We can now add a final chapter to the story.

The manuscript on Christian martyrs was written in Edessa (now Sanliurfa or Urfa, Turkey), and at some point in the next five centuries it was taken eastwards. In 931, the abbot of Deir al-Surian travelled to Baghdad and brought it back to Egypt.

In 1086, a monk added a marginal note in the middle of the manuscript, expressing concern that the last page with its colophon (the scribe’s ending notes) might be lost. Since the book was by then already “ancient”, he wanted to record that it had been written in 411. The monk’s precaution was wise, since centuries later the last page did indeed become detached.

Discovery

The European who found the main manuscript was Lord Curzon, who visited Deir al-Surian in 1837 in search of ancient texts for the British Museum. There were then only a dozen monks, led by a blind and elderly abbot. Lord Curzon bought three Coptic manuscripts, but he had heard rumours that earlier texts in Syriac were hidden in the cellar of the ancient tower, in a vault used to store olive oil.

He recounts producing a bottle of rosoglio (an Italian cordial), since with eastern monks “there is no better opener of the heart than a sufficiency of strong drink”. After plying the abbot with alcohol, he coaxed him into instructing a monk to lead him down into the cellar.

Adjacent to the main oil store, Lord Curzon found “a small closet vaulted with stone which was filled to a depth of two feet or more with the loose leaves of Syriac manuscripts”. He extracted four relatively complete codices, and talked the inebriated abbot into selling them for “a certain number of piastres”.

The abbot would only allow Lord Curzon to fill one of his camel’s saddlebags with manuscripts, since he did not want the other monks to notice what was happening. There was insufficient space for all his purchases, so Lord Curzon reluctantly left one behind.

Recovery

A fragment of a manuscript.

Lord Curzon’s acquisitions whetted the appetite of the British Museum, and two years later it sent scholar Dr Henry Tattam to Deir al-Surian. Among the several hundred manuscripts he purchased was the one that Lord Curzon had been forced to leave behind. Back in London, the note made by the monk in 1086 was spotted.

The note on folio 239 read: “Behold my brethren, if it should happen that the end of this ancient book should be torn off and lost...it was written at the end of it thus.” The monk had then copied out the colophon, which stated that the manuscript had been written at Orrhoa (Edessa, now Sanliurfa), by Jacob, in the year 723 (in the Greek calendar, or 411 AD).

The original colophon was missing when the codex was acquired in 1839, but the monk’s note made it possible to date it. Four years later Cureton discovered two further pages of the manuscript among fragments which had been brought back by Tattam.

There was one further British Museum expedition to Deir al-Surian, undertaken by the Alexandrian entrepreneur Auguste Pacho in 1845. He successfully acquired nearly 200 volumes, plus fragments. Cureton went through the material, finding two further damaged leaves of the 411 manuscript. Attached to the second one was a strip of the adjacent leaf; it had text on one side, but the other was blank, suggesting it was the final page.

Cureton continued his search, looking through 20 bundles of small fragments. He eventually found three pieces from the penultimate leaf, and then a fourth one from the final leaf. By good fortune, this tiny fragment had the original colophon, recording the 411 date.

Jigsaw puzzle

There the matter rested for a century and a half. In 1998, the ninth-century tower of Deir al-Surian was renovated, and several hundred fragments of ancient manuscripts were discovered by the monastery’s librarian Father Bigoul under a wooden floor which had probably collapsed as long ago as the 14th century.

It is unfortunate that such drastic restoration of an ancient building was done so casually (surprisingly, it was authorised by Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities). No trained archaeologists sifted through the rubble, although Father Bigoul did his best to save what he could. Modern building materials were used in the reconstruction.

Nevertheless, the work did result in the discovery of the manuscript fragments. Analysing the find has taken time, but in 2005 two Syriac scholars, Sebastian Brock (Oxford University) and Lucas van Rompay (Duke University, North Carolina), recognised four small fragments which appeared to be in the same neat handwriting as the 411 manuscript.

In London they consulted the codex, and found that the four fragments were indeed from the final page. These wrinkled pieces have now been conserved at the monastery by London paper specialist Elizabeth Sobczynski.

After showing us the fragments, Father Bigoul took us down into the cellar, where he had discovered them. In an adjacent vault, there is still a pile of ancient amphorae once used to store olive oil.

Back in London, we looked at the British Library’s codex and noticed a stain in a corner of most of the parchment pages. Conservators confirm that it is olive oil.

Conservation

For most of the 20th century, Deir al-Surian’s manuscripts were hidden away—and relatively neglected. The monks were understandably reluctant to show them to outsiders, since their collection had been denuded in the 18th and 19th centuries by European bibliophiles.

But despite these losses, Deir al-Surian still retains 1,000 manuscripts, of which 49 are in Syriac. It also has 150 ancient Coptic manuscripts and 15 Ethiopic texts. Recent cataloguing has uncovered the world’s oldest dated Biblical manuscript in any language, a Syriac version of Isaiah, from 459 AD.

Around a century ago, the collection was moved from the tower, where it had probably been kept for over 1,000 years. It was then stored in large wooden crates in the monks’ cells. Unfortunately, as recently as the mid-20th century, serious damage was caused by mice and insects. In 1970 the library was given its own premises at the top of a modern building.

Since 1997 preservation work has been spearheaded by Ms Sobczynski, working with international and Egyptian conservators. So far they have conserved a dozen manuscripts, and over 300 fragments.

The Syriac manuscripts were hidden away from outsiders until after 2000, and the extent of the holdings remained unknown. They are now being catalogued by Brock and Van Rompay.

Not surprisingly, monks and conservators have different perspectives. Most monks would have preferred the ancient manuscripts to be rebound in modern materials, whereas conservators want to preserve what can be saved of earlier bindings.

The library remains in unsuitable premises. Temperature and humidity fluctuate considerably, and a kitchen on a floor below is a serious fire hazard (smoke alarms were only fitted in 2000).

A purpose-built library and conservation studio is therefore being built within the monastery walls. Construction of the new “green” library building will begin this month, with completion scheduled for early next year. It will cost £400,000, and Ms Sobczynski has set up the Levantine Foundation charity to raise funds.

World’s Oldest Temple Offers Glimpse of the Garden of Eden

Courtesy of the Walrus
20 February 2008
Yigal Schleifer

(ZNDA:  Baghdad)  At a small archaeological site about twenty kilometres outside Sanliurfa, in southeastern Turkey, Klaus Schmidt climbs to the top of a hill, moving quickly despite the stifling heat. Schmidt is the fifty-three-year-old director of the dig. His face is red from the sun, and his only protection from its rays is a white cotton scarf wrapped around his head, kaffiyeh style. Atop the windswept hill, bare except for a solitary mulberry tree, he looks down on what may be the most remarkable archaeological find of the past century.

“The level of importance here is that of the pyramids in Giza, or Stonehenge,” says Schmidt, who speaks softly, with a strong German accent. “This is the first monumental work in the history of mankind. It’s a singular site.” Schmidt got an early start in archaeology, mucking around as a child in the caves of his native Bavaria in a fruitless search for drawings left by cavemen. His luck changed fourteen years ago when he first came to Göbekli Tepe (Turkish for “navel on the mountain”).

From where he stands, he can see four circles of large, T-shaped stone pillars arranged around two even larger monoliths — some five metres tall — that tower over the circles. Many of the forty-odd pillars are decorated with exquisite relief carvings depicting a lush landscape populated by wild boars, birds, reptiles, and lions. The level of representation becomes even more breathtaking in the context of the site’s age; the various layers were created somewhere between 7500 and 10,000 BC, according to carbon dating done by Schmidt. That’s before the invention of the wheel.

To put this finding in perspective, until the discovery of Göbekli Tepe, arguably the oldest temple excavated was at Eridu, in Iraq, which dates to 5000 BC. Stonehenge’s rough pillars, which look like the work of rank amateurs compared to the handiwork here, only go back to approximately 2100 BC.

It may sound as if Schmidt has been standing out in the blazing sun too long, but he’s no fringe archaeologist. He’s a veteran of another groundbreaking dig in Turkey and a respected member of the august German Archaeological Institute in Berlin. He and Göbekli Tepe have already created a serious buzz among other archaeologists who study the early neolithic period, when hunter-gatherers in the Near East started the process of cultivating cereals and producing their own food. “It’s a very important site, a central ritual site, like the temple in Jerusalem or the Oracle at Delphi,” says Ofer Bar-Yosef, MacCurdy Professor of Prehistoric Archaeology at Harvard, who has visited Schmidt’s dig. “It has changed for many people the conception of what was happening during the neolithic period.

“The findings at Göbekli Tepe have given Schmidt and his colleagues a profoundly new understanding of this part of the world at that time. The local culture, he now believes, was much more developed and organized than previously thought. The builders of Göbekli Tepe could already muster — and feed — the enormous manpower needed to carve the massive columns and bring them to the temple site.

Even more surprising, Schmidt says, is the sophistication of religious expression found at Göbekli Tepe. Because of the lack of settlements nearby, Schmidt and others believe the site was a destination for pilgrims and a place of ritual. “What we have here is an expression of religion in a very stylized way that is not repeated anywhere else in the world,” he says. “We see that religion was existing in the early neolithic period in a way that we didn’t expect. Only religion could be responsible for what we see here.

“Something else is adding to the buzz around Göbekli Tepe — speculation that may tie the spot to the Bible’s Garden of Eden story. Some respected researchers, such as archaeologist Alan Millard and biologist Colin Tudge, both based in England, have put forward the theory that the Ed